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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent,
 C a s e No^ 1 4 4 4 g 
-vs- : 
JAMES ELDON McNICOL, JR., 
Defendant-Appellant• 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT AND NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant McNicol appeals from a jury verdict of 
guilty of Criminal Homocide, Second Degree Murder, rendered 
against him on January 5, 1976, in the District Court of 
the Third Judicial District in and for Tooele County 
before the Honorable Gordon R. Hall. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the conviction affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On July 23, 1975, defendant and deceased were in 
an apartment they shared in Pine Canyon, Tooele County, 
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Utah (Ex, 2). Deceased was talking with the defendant, 
he arose from the couch and grabbed her from behind, 
holding one arm across her neck while putting his knee 
in her back (Ex. 2). Deceased then dropped to the floor. 
Defendant left her on the floor and proceeded to listen 
to the radio while lying on the couch. When defendant 
awoke, he realized deceased had in fact died. He then 
removed her clothes, put her in bed, and went in another 
room to listen to the radio (Ex. 2). 
The next day after drinking beer at the home 
of a friend, defendant told his cousin that he had 
killed the deceased. Defendant then went to the 
Sherifffs office in Tooele County and gave a four page 
signed statement (Ex. 2) after signing a Waiver of 
Rights Statement (Ex. P-l). 
The Utah State Medical Examiner reported that 
the deceased died of manual strangulation (R-28). 
Defendant was thereafter charged with the crime 
of criminal homocide, murder in the second degree, and 
attorney Morris D. Young was appointed to represent him. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
REPRESENTATION BY APPOINTED COUNSEL MEASURED 
UP TO THE REQUIRED STANDARD OF A COMPETENT MEMBER OF THE 
BAR RENDERING REASONABLE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE. 
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Appellant sets forth a single point on appeal, 
arguing that his representation by appointed counsel 
on a charge of second degree murder was so ineffective 
as not to measure up to reasonably effective assistance 
rendered by a competent member of the Bar. Appellant 
bases his argument on several aspects of the conduct 
of the trial, concluding that even though any one matter 
in and of itself might not require a reversal, the 
entire transcript presents a picture of a completely 
inadequate defense. 
As appellant correctly points out, the Utah 
Supreme Court has enunciated in Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 
2d 118, 449 P.2d 241 (1969) the test to be utilized 
whenever the question of ineffective counsel is raised. 
In Alires, the court first stated that the right of 
an accused to counsel is included in the concept of due 
process of law, embodied as it is in the United States 
and Utah Constitutions. The requirement of counsel, said 
the court: 
" . . .is not satisfied by a 
sham or pretense of an appearance in 
the record by an attorney who manifests 
no real concern about the interests 
of the accused." 
Immediately following the above quoted sentence 
the court turns its attention to the standard required 
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by due process to be applied to appointed counseel: 
"The entitlement is to the assistance 
of a competent member of the Bar, who 
shows a willingness to identify himself 
with the interests of the defendant and 
present such defenses as are available 
to him under the law and consistent 
with the ethics of the profession." 
Alires v. Turner, Id. at 121. 
Appellant has quoted only the latter sentence from 
Alires, supra. However, respondent maintains that an 
accurate analysis of the standard set forth in Alires 
supra, requires a reading of the entire case and focusing 
upon what the court says in regard to an attorney 
manifesting real concern about the interests of the 
accused. 
As is pointed out in United States v. DeCoster, 
487 F.2d 1197 (1973), cited by appellant, it is very 
important to stress that the issue on any uneffective 
counsel case is not the culpability of a lawyer, but 
rather the constitutional rights of the accused. 
Turning to the instant case, the trial record 
reflects that the defendant McNicol was properly repre-
sented by counsel so as not to impair any of his con-
stitutional rights. McNicol exercised the right, through 
counsel, to confront witnesses against him. McNicol 
exercised his right to take the witness stand on his 
own behalf. The defendant was granted a speedy trial 
and a jury trial. 
-4-
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I 
of appellant's argument that he was denied effective 
assistance of counsel could be a matter of trial 
strategy again, appellant cannot argue that the trial 
record is devoid of any showing of concern for his 
interests by defense counsel. 
In Strong v. Turner, 22 Utah 2d 294, 4 52 P.2d 
323 (1969) the defendant claimed that he was denied 
effective assistance of counsel based in part upon 
the fact that his appointed attorney held only brief 
conferences with him at the preliminary hearing and 
before a plea was entered. The court answered that 
there is no inherent wrong in the fact that the con-
ferences were of short duration. The important factor 
is what is done in the conference, not the time consumed 
in doing it. Certainly the length of the trial in 
the instant case is not in and of itself conclusive 
on the issue of ineffecitve counsel, as appellant 
seems to argue. 
The defendant in Strong v. Turner, also claimed 
that he was coerced by his counsel into entering a guilty 
plea to one charge based upon the promise of the prosecutor 
to drop two other charges. However, the court found that 
there was ample evidence that defendant well understood 
what he was doing and entered the plea voluntarily. 
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Strong v, Turner court thus concluded that a review of 
the record did not support defendant's claim that the 
particular matters cited required granting of a writ 
of habeas corpus based upon the claim of ineffective 
counsel at trial. 
Appellant herein aruges in his conclusion 
that the entire trial record, read as a whole, reflects 
a completely inadequate defense requiring reversal and a 
new trial. Appellant thus urges the court to read 
thoroughly the trial transcript in its entirety in the 
case of State v. McNicol. 
Respondent would join in this request to the court. 
However, it is the belief of respondent that the record 
as a whole measures up to the standard set forth in 
Alires v. Turner; of reasonably effective assistance 
rendered by a competent member of the Bar. 
If the court should find that any of the 
particulars raised by appellant herein do not measure 
up to the above standard, one further question must be 
asked. The court must determine whether there is some 
basis for believing that a better representation by counsel 
would have been advantageous to appellant at trial. 
As was said in Alires v. Turner; 
"This is so because it is the 
policy of our law established both by 
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statute and decision that we do not 
reverse for mere error or irregularity, 
but only where it is substantial and 
prejudicial." Alires v. Turner, 22 Utah 
2d 118, at p. 120. 
The particular matters cited by appellant as 
evidence of ineffective representation by defense 
counsel cannot be said, standing alone or as a whole, 
to have had such an effect upon the result, appellant's 
conviction of Second Degree Murder, as to require a new 
trial. Assuming for the sake of argument that the defense 
attorney herein failed to object to leading questions, 
failed to thoroughly cross-examine and failed to probe 
any and all possible defenses; that he failed to counter 
adverse impressions left by prosecution witnesses, failed 
to object to the admission of exhibits, and finally, 
that he failed to object to Jury Instruction Number 11, 
there is absolutely no rational reason to believe that 
the verdict would have been different. 
As to the failure of defense attorney to object 
to Jury Instruction Number 11, defining the elements of 
murder in the second degree, appellant argues that this 
Instruction does not state that the jury may consider 
lesser included offenses if the evidence fails to establish 
one or more elements of the crime charged beyond a 
reasonable doubt. However, as appellant himself concedes, 
Jury Instruction Number 12 explicitly defines the elements 
of Manslaughter, and states that it is an included offense 
of the Information. Jury Instruction Number 13 proceeds 
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to define the elements of Negligent Homocide, and also 
describes it as an included offense of the Information. 
Respondent respectfully argues that defense attorney 
had no reason to object to Jury Instruction Number 
11, since Jury Instructions 11, 12 and 13, read along 
with the four verdicts submitted to the jury, clearly 
and without equivocation inform the jury that Man-
slaughter and Negligent Homocide are lesser included 
offenses of Second Degree Murder as charged on the 
Information. 
CONCLUSION 
The record on appeal and the transcript in 
State v. McNicol support respondent's contention that 
appellant herein was given legal representation by 
his appointed counsel which meausres up to the standard 
set by the Utah Supreme Court. Appellant's defense 
attorney rendered reasonably effective assistance of 
counsel as a competent member of the Bar. None of the 
matters cited by appellant in arguing that his represen-
tation was so ineffective as not to measure up to the 
above cited standard, either standing alone or as a 
whole, could be said to have had such an effect on the 
verdict as to require reversal. Based upon the above 
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cited authority and argument, respondent requests that 
the verdict be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
EARL F. DORIUS 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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